Freya Pentz
Author bio: Freya recently finished a master’s in Environment, Politics and Development at SOAS and is a member of the Young China Watchers London chapter. She spent two years living in China as a teacher and wrote her master’s dissertation on China’s green transition and the pursuit of ecological civilisation.
FOCAC 2024 and the future of China-Africa relations
A post-forum panel discussion of the outcomes of FOCAC 2024 and what to expect of future China-Africa relations
This event, co-hosted by Young China Watchers and Chinese in Africa/Africans in China Research Network, was a deep dive into the recently concluded Forum on China-Africa cooperation (FOCAC). The panel discussion took place on Tuesday 10th September at the London School of Economics (LSE), and featured speakers Frangton Chiyemura from The Open University, Jade Scarfe from Development Reimagined, Yunnan Chen from the Overseas Development Institute and Lukas Fiala from LSE. It was chaired by Young China Watcher’s Belinda Schäpe. This summary presents some of the insights from the expert panel.
Launched in 2000 and held every three years, this year marked the 9th FOCAC. Despite global disruptions, including the COVID-19 pandemic when other regional forums were cancelled, FOCAC has never been missed. This year was an important forum for both China and African countries. The economic relationship is changing amidst global challenges which affect both regions. Key challenges include healthcare post-pandemic, economic crises around the world, and global security, with conflict in the Middle East and Ukraine. All of these affect China’s economic capacity and ability to collaborate on the large infrastructure projects that typically result from FOCAC.
Key results from FOCAC 2024 are the FOCAC action plan, President Xi’s speech and the many bilateral meetings between China and countries or regions that will result in further meetings and collaboration down the line. The forum resulted in a headline figure of $50 billion of loans, investment and aid from China, a smaller amount than the $60 billion package in 2018 but larger than the $40 billion in 2021. Despite the muted figure compared to pre-pandemic, the consistency of the event sets it apart from any other Africa summits. As an example, 2022 saw the first US-Africa Leaders summit since the one held in 2014. This is an important signal from China that African countries are respected partners and the collaboration is valuable. Unlike other Africa summits, FOCAC goes well beyond organising economic aid. It has become a network building tool to create complex policy-oriented communities who continue to collaborate after the conclusion of the event.
In the context of these key outcomes, China seems to have tried to stage a comeback during this FOCAC. Colonialism was a buzzword in the meetings and speeches, as China aimed to emphasise its position as an alternative to Western modernity even while it struggles with structural challenges domestically. Western stakeholders have historically treated many African countries as sites of competition rather than collaboration. China wants to be a different type of investor and emphasises ‘non-interference’. In President Xi’s speech, confrontational language this year situates FOCAC and the China-Africa relationship as a key part of the China-USA competition. China continues to present itself as an alternative to Western investment sources. However, organisations receiving investment must respect the one China policy and there is an expectation that projects will be implemented by Chinese contractors. Chinese investment may still be the best option as the time required to start a project is typically much faster than with other investors, and China consistently meets African leaders as political equals, rather than employing the paternalistic attitudes more common in the West.
Before the forum, some commentators speculated that African countries come to the event as less powerful parties who have little control over the agenda. This forum proved that wrong, as many key outcomes from the African side were achieved. These include a shift towards a continental vision for Africa, with Agenda 2063 mentioned eight times in the action plan. In addition, key infrastructure and trade agreements like the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa and the African Continental Free Trade Area were upheld and discussed during the forum.
China’s own initiatives, like the Global Development Initiative (GDI) also featured prominently this year. The 2024 action plan focused on smaller, high-impact projects (dubbed ‘small and beautiful’) rather than large infrastructure deals. The move towards small and beautiful projects addresses specific needs in communities such as education, agriculture and energy. These targeted, community-based projects, rather than large national infrastructure projects, help China further its expansion of GDI goals which include supporting the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. This focus on China’s own development frameworks speaks to an agenda of Chinese exceptionalism and China’s assertion of power in international development.
A recurring theme of this forum was green technology and development. Green development is part of the development trajectory as a whole and has become a focus for the BRI and other projects. While there are mixed results in terms of implementation of green pledges, speeches and discussions at FOCAC can have signalling effects to businesses and other organisations that influence where investment is made.
This was an important FOCAC that has defined the China-Africa relationship post-COVID as one of increasing geopolitical importance, with the two regions meeting as equals to engage in mutually beneficial partnerships. As China increasingly positions itself as a new kind of investment option, African countries will continue to benefit from its position as one of the longest-standing partners of this growing centre of power.
Further resources:
https://podcasts.apple.com/gb/podcast/the-china-in-africa-podcast/id484409506?i=1000668104099
Opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views of Young China Watchers.